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This paper uses newly available Chinese micro data to estimate the return to college education for late 20
th 
century China when allowing for heterogeneous returns among individuals selecting into schooling based on these 
differences. We use recently developed semiparametric methods to identify the parameters of interest. We 
demonstrate that heterogeneity among people in returns to schooling is substantial. People sort into schooling on 
the basis of the principle of comparative advantage, which we document to be an empirically important 
phenomenon in modern Chinese labor markets. Standard least squares or instrumental variable methods do not 
properly account for this sorting. Using new methods that do, we estimate the effect on earnings of sending a 
randomly selected person to college is a 43% increase in lifetime earnings (nearly 11% annually) in 2000 for 
young people in urban areas of six provinces of China. The effect of college on those who go is 13%. Our 
evidence, and simple least squares evidence, suggests that after 20-plus years of economic reform with market 
orientation, the return to education has increased substantially in China, compared to the returns measured in the 
1980’s and the early 1990’s. 
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1. Introduction 
Heterogeneity and missing counterfactual states are central features of microdata. Due to unobserved 
heterogeneity, observationally identical people make different choices, earn different wages and hold different 
levels and compositions of asset portfolios. The evaluation problem for social programs arises from a missing data 
problem. We cannot observe the outcomes of all possible choices for the same person. If we observe wages for 
college graduates, we cannot observe the wages they would have earned if they had been high school graduates. 
Conventional approaches to selection and missing data problems do not account for heterogeneity in 
responses to schooling on which agents select into schooling. This paper uses newly released cross-sectional 
micro data from the China Urban Household Investment and Expenditure Survey (CUHIES 2000), to estimate the 
return to education for China when responses to schooling differ among individuals and individuals select into 
schooling based their idiosyncratic returns. Our work draws on previous research by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 
2000, 2001), Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Carneiro (2002), which develops a semiparametric 
framework that accounts for heterogeneity and selection.
1 
Our results reveal that the average treatment effect (ATE) of four year college attendance (the earnings 
gain arising from randomly selecting someone to go to college for four years), is 43% (the annual return is 10.8%) 
in 2000 for young people in urban areas of six provinces of China, whereas the OLS  (Ordinary Least Squares) 
and IV  (Instrumental Variables) estimators give 29% and 56% respectively (with estimated annual returns of 
7.25% and 14% respectively). Heterogeneity in returns is substantial in the population. Estimated selection bias is 
an empirically important negative 22%. Like Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), we find that there is 
comparative advantage in the labor market for schooling. The best college graduates are among the worst high 
school graduates. OLS  gives a downward-biased estimate of ATE . IV  produces an upward biased estimate of 
ATE . 
                                                 
1 The MTE is the central concept in this literature. It was introduced by Bjorklund and Moffitt (1987). The marginal 
treatment effect is the average return to schooling for persons indifferent to going on to schooling at different levels of 
unobservable factors that determine schooling choices. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001) show that all conventional 
treatment parameters are different weighted averages of this parameter. 
   4
After more than twenty years of economic reform with market orientation, the average return to education 
in China measured by OLS or ATE has increased markedly when compared to those in the 1980’s and early 
1990’s. (Chow 2001 presents estimates of OLS-generated rates of return in this period). Education markets have 
begun to function effectively in China, and skills are now being rewarded more adequately than they have been in 
the past. 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes earnings models with and without 
heterogeneous returns to education. Section 3 defines selection bias, defines the marginal treatment effect and 
presents a semiparametric method for estimating it. Section 4 discusses our data and presents empirical results for 
China. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Models with and without Heterogeneity 
We first consider a conventional model of the return to education without heterogeneity in returns. We 
write the following common coefficient Mincer model: 
     i i i i U X S Y + + = γ β ln                                                                                                         (1) 
where  i   is a subscript for individuals ( n   ,     , 2   , 1 " = i ),  i Y ln   is log income,  i S   is schooling level or years of 
schooling,  i X   is a vector of variables such as an intercept, years of Mincer experience, Mincer experience 
squared, and dummy variables for sex, region, sector, and ownership of firm.  i U   is the residual term with 
0 ) ( = i U E , β  is the rate of return to education, and γ  is a vector of coefficients. 
One problem with OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates of Equation (1) is that there may be an 
omitted ability  i A , which is in the residual term  i U . Many empirical analysts suspect that  0 )   , ( ≠ i i S A Cov  so that 
0 ) ( ≠ i i S U E and OLS  gives biased and inconsistent estimates (Griliches, 1977 is a classic statement of this 
problem).
2 
                                                 
2 Most data sets do not contain measures of ability. Economists use three strategies to eliminate or attenuate the ability bias. 
A huge literature uses instrumental variables (IV). The goal of this literature is to find an instrument  i I  that is highly 
correlated with  i S  but not correlated with  i U . The second approach uses the fixed effect method: find a paired comparison   5
The specification we consider is more general than the model (1). We estimate a model with 
heterogeneous returns to education, which may be written in random coefficient form as 
     i i i i i U X S Y + + = γ β ln                                                                                                       (2) 
where  i β  is the heterogeneous rate of return to education, which varies among individuals.  i X  is a vector of 
conditioning variables defined below.  This model accounts for ability bias in a more general setting. 
In this paper we focus on two schooling choices: high school and college. We let  1 = i S  denote four-year 
college graduates and  0 = i S  for senior high school graduates (those not going to college). Clearly, there are 
more choices of schooling and our analysis is a simplification of reality, but is a natural starting point with ample 
precedents in the literature. There is considerable evidence in many contexts that returns to schooling are 
nonlinear in years of schooling so conventional log wage on years of schooling regression coefficients generate 
rates of return that are badly biased estimates of the return to college education. (Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 
2003). 
The two potential selection outcomes  ) ln   , (ln 1 0 i i Y Y  can be written as 
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where  0 ) ( 0 = i i X U E  and  0 ) ( 1 = i i X U E  in the population. In the notation of equation (2), observed log earnings 
0 ln (1 )ln iii i i YSY S Y =+ −  and  10 (1 ) ii i i i US U S U =+ − . 
                                                                                                                                                                         
such as a genetic twin or sibling with similar or identical ability. A third approach is to use proxy variables for ability and 
include them as regressors in  i X . 
Many data sets do not have enough information to use the fixed effect method, and the method is critically dependent on 
additive separability of errors. Such comparisons may exacerbate measurement error problems. It is also very hard to find 
satisfactory instruments. In fact, most commonly used instruments in the schooling literature are invalid because they are 
correlated with the omitted ability. (See Carneiro and Heckman, 2002 and Carneiro, 2002). 
An alternative method uses proxies for ability and includes them as the regressors. Many empirical analyses reveal that better 
family background and better family resources are usually associated with better environments that raise ability (Carneiro and 
Heckman, 2003). We use parental income as a proxy for ability in our empirical work. 
   6
In a cross section it is usually impossible to know both  i Y0 ln  and  i Y1 ln  for anyone due to a fundamental 
missing data problem. For those going to college, we cannot observe  i Y0 ln ; for those not going to college, we 
cannot observe  i Y1 ln . So we can only determine the distributions  ) 0 (ln 0 = i i i , S X Y F  and  ) 1 (ln 1 = i i i , S X Y F  
but not  ) (ln 0 i i X Y F  or  ) (ln 1 i i X Y F . In the presence of heterogeneity and selection in general, we can no longer 
use conventional methods like OLS   or Instrumental Variables (IV) to identify economically interesting 
parameters.  
Collecting results 
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     ) ( ) ( 0 1 0 1 i i i i U U X − + − = γ γ β                                                                                           (5) 
is the heterogeneous return to education for individual i . When  0 1 γ γ ≠  (i.e. there is an observed heterogeneity 
term  i X ) ( 0 1 γ γ − ), or  i i U U 0 1 ≠  (i.e. there is an unobserved heterogeneity term  ) ( 0 1 i i U U − ),  i β  varies in the 
population, the return to schooling is a random variable with a distribution. In the first case where we condition on 
X, the distribution of returns is degenerate. In the second case it is not degenerate. The mean of  i β  given X is: 
     10 () ( ) [ ( )] ii i X EXE X ββ γ γ == −                                                                                          (6) 
    Suppose individuals select going to college (or not) according to the following decision rule: 
    
* ()
1    if     0
      0       otherwise,








                                                                                                           (7) 
where 
*
i S  is a latent variable denoting the net benefit of going to school and  i Z  is an observed vector of variables 
( i Z  may include some  i X ). ) ( i i i Z P P =  is the propensity score or probability of receiving treatment (going to 
college), which can be estimated by a logit or probit model.  si U  is the unobserved heterogeneity for individual i  
in the treatment selection equation.    7
Without loss of generality we may assume that ] 1   , 0 [ ~Unif U si  (See Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999). The 
decision of whether to go to college (or not) for individual i  is determined completely by the comparison of the 
observed heterogeneity  ) ( i i Z P  with the unobserved heterogeneity  si U . The smaller the  si U , the more likely the 
person goes to college. 
 
3. Selection Bias and The Marginal Treatment Effect 
Let  i i i Y Y 0 1 ln ln − = ∆  be the economic (gross) return to a policy that moves individual i from  0 = i S  to 
1 = i S . According to Equations (3a), (3b) and (5),  i i β = ∆ , is the causal effect of education.  Using equations 
(3a), (3b) and (6), the probability limit of the ordinary least squares estimator can be written as: 
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where  ATE  is the average treatment effect, (the effect of randomly assigning a person with characteristics X to 
schooling) defined as 
     () () ( ) ii ii ATE E X E X X ββ =∆ = = .                                                                                      (9) 
If agents know and act on some components of  , 01 () ii UU ,  i S  is generally correlated with both  i U0  and 
i U1 , and the second term in Equation (8) will be not zero, so OLS  is biased for  ATE . 
Note that Equation (8) can also be written as: 
     00
ˆ plim( ) (ln , 1) (ln , 0)
               ,  1)         [ ( 1) ( 0)]
                      
OLS i i i i i i
iii i i i i
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E(β XS E US E US
     (TT)                            (Selection Bias)
β == −=
== + = − =                       (10)                  
where TT  is treatment on the treated, the effect of treatment on those who receive it (e.g., goes to college) 
compared to what they would experience without treatment (i.e., do not go to college), defined as:   8
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=+−= = +−=                     (11) 
  The sorting effect  10 (1 ) ii i EU U S −=  is the mean gain of the unobservables for people who choose “1”. 
The selection bias  0 (1 ) ii EU S = - 0 (0 ) ii EU S =  is the mean difference in the no schooling (S=0) unobservables 
between those who go to school and those who do not. It is the difference in unobservables between what college 
graduates would earn if they were high school graduates and what high school graduates would earn. The bias in 
(8) is the sum of sorting and selection bias. 
Conventional  IV  estimators do not, in general, identify these treatment parameters in the presence of 
heterogeneity and selection. Finding an instrument  i I  correlated with  i S  but not  i U0  or even  i i U U 0 1 −  is not 
enough to identify  () X β , because: 
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                (12) 
where ) 1 Pr( = = i i S P  is the propensity score. In the presence of both heterogeneity and selection bias,  i i U U 0 1 ≠ , 
i i U U 0 1 −  is dependent on Si, so the second term in Equation (12) will be not zero, thus  ˆ plim( ) ( ) IV X ββ ≠ so IV 
is not a consistent estimator. Only in some very special circumstances, when  0 0 1 = − i i U U  (i.e.  neither 
unobserved heterogeneity nor selection bias exist) or when  i i U U 0 1 ≠  but  i i U U 0 1 −  is independent of Si (i.e. there 
is unobserved heterogeneity but no selection bias), will the second term in Equation (12) be zero. In this case, IV  
is a consistent estimator for  () X β  (Heckman, 1997 and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2003). 
    Neither OLS  nor IV  is a consistent estimator of the mean return to education in the presence of heterogeneity 
and selection. However, under the assumptions presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001), Carneiro, 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), Carneiro (2002) and Navarro-Lozano (2002), it is possible to identify the 
heterogeneous return to education with marginal treatment effect (MTE ) via the method of Local Instrument 
Variables (LIV ), where MTE  is:   9
    
10 1 0
() ) )
                                       ( ) ( ) .
is i s i is i s i is i s
ii s i s
M T E Xx ,  UuE (Xx ,  UuE ( β Xx ,  Uu
xE U UU u γγ
== = ∆ == = ==
=− + − =
                 (13) 
The MTE  is the average willingness to pay (WTP) for  i Y1 ln  (compared to  i Y0 ln ) given characteristics  i X  and 
unobserved heterogeneity  si U .
3  MTE   can be estimated from the following relationship, where LIV  can  be 
estimated by semiparametric methods for derivatives (see Heckman 2001): 
    
p
p x, P X Y E
p x, P X LIV p P U x X MTE
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) (ln
) ( )   , (    .              (14) 
For notational simplicity, we keep the conditioning on X implicit in what follows. 
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001) and Carneiro (2002) establish that all the other treatment 
variables can be unified using MTE  
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Treatment on the untreated (TUT ) is the effect of treatment on those who do not receive it (i.e. do not go 
to college) compared to what they would experience with the treatment (i.e. go to college), which is defined as: 
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3 MTE was introduced into the literature in a parametric context by Anders Bjorklund and Robert Moffitt (1987).   10
4. Data Set and Empirical Results 
Our data are from the China Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey (CUHIES) for the year 
2000, which was conducted by the Urban Socio-Economic Survey Organization of the National Bureau of 
Statistics. The survey is a sequence of cross-sections from 1992 to 2002 and is ongoing. The urban data randomly 
selects households across the whole urban population. 
We have the data for the year 2000 for urban areas of six provinces: Guangdong, Liaoning, Sichuan, 
Shaanxi, Zhejiang and Beijing. Four provinces, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Beijing and Liaoning, are located in 
eastern part of China, while the other two, Sichuan and Shaanxi, are in the western part. Table 1 provides the 
comparison of average resident income in urban areas among these provinces. The average resident incomes in 
the three provinces, Beijing, Guangdong and Zhejiang, are much higher than the average level of China, while 
they are a bit lower in the other three provinces, Sichuan, Liaoning and Shaanxi. The average income in the six 
provinces we use is 7627 yuan, which is higher than the average income of China, 6280 yuan. 
The sample size for the six provinces is 4250 households. For each household, there is rich information 
on all household members, including head, spouse, children and parents. Age, sex, education level, employment 
status and enterprise ownership, occupation, years of work experience and total annual income are available for 
each household member. There are seven education levels in the sample: university, college, special technical 
school, senior high school, junior high school, primary school, and other. 
For our purposes, we combine all the children in the six provinces who are either college or university 
graduates or senior high school graduates. They are all working and earn positive wages in 2000. Our sample 
consists of 587 individuals, including 273 people with four-year college (or university) certificates and 314 people 
with only senior high school certificates. There are 331 males and 256 females in the sample. The summary 
statistics for the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 2, which reveals the individuals in the sample 
are mainly young adults with a mean age of 26.3. Thus ours is an analysis of wages early in the life cycle of new 
cohorts of Chinese workers. 
Table 3 presents OLS  and IV  estimates of the mean return to four-year college attendance. We use the 
probability of going to college as the instrument with the exclusions defined below. The OLS  and IV  estimates 
are 29% and 56% respectively for the young people in the urban areas of six provinces of China in 2000   11
(annualized 7.25% and 14%, respectively). The OLS estimates are much higher than the OLS estimates reported 
by Chow (2001) for an earlier period (1980’s and early 1990’s). The variables in the outcome equation include the 
years of Mincer experience, Mincer experience squared, our proxy of ability (we use parental income as the proxy 
in this paper) and some dummy variables such as the sex, the provinces of residence, the sector and the firm 
ownership in which he or she works.  The propensity score is estimated by a logistic model, with coefficient 
estimates presented in Table 4.
4 
We use father’s education, mother’s education, parental income, and the year of birth as determinants of 
the probability of going to college. The last column of the table is the mean marginal effect for each explanatory 
variable. Figure 1 shows the density function for the estimated probability of college attendance (Pr( 1)) S = . 
Table 5 and Figure 2 give the results from our semiparametric estimation. We use parental income in the 
earnings function to control for ability.  For details on the procedures used to generate these numbers see 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), whom we follow. Table 5 contains the estimated coefficients for 
Equations (3a) and (3b) using local linear regression. Figure 2 plots the estimated marginal treatment effect as a 
function unobserved heterogeneity  s u , the components in the choice equation. The MTE  is declining in  s u . This 
implies that people with lower  s u , i.e. those more likely to go to college according to the decision rule (7), have 
higher marginal returns to schooling. The people with the highest  s u , who are least likely going to college, have 
the lowest average returns. Figure 2 suggests substantial heterogeneity in the return to education for China. The 
declining  MTE implies that matching and conventional OLS  and IV methods do not identify any relevant 
treatment effect in our data. (See Heckman, 2001 or Heckman and Navarro, 2003). It also suggests that the 
marginal participant in Chinese higher education earns less than the average participant. 
Table 6 presents a comparison among various treatment parameters. The average return to 4-year college 
attendance for a randomly selected person is 43% (11% annually) given by ATE . The effect of going to college 
                                                 
4 The general forms of the logistic model and the marginal effects derived from it are defined as: 
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on those who go is 51%, so there is purposive sorting into schooling on the basis of gain (13% annual). The OLS  
estimator is downward biased for ATE with only a 29% return (7% annual). The inconsistent IV  estimator is 56% 
and is upward biased due to heterogeneity and selection bias (Heckman and Vytlacil derive the exact bias). The 
Chinese data set show that  OLS ATE IV > > . The estimated selection bias of –22% is very important in 
estimating the economic return to schooling for China. Persons who go to college would make poor high school 
graduates. Treatment on the treated (TT ) and treatment on the untreated (TUT ) are 51% and 36% respectively. 
Thus IV is upward biased for TT. 
The estimated sorting gain is large and positive, suggesting that the principle of comparative advantage is 
important. The “sorting gain” reported in Table 6 is defined as: 
             Sorting Gain  ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ii i i i i  E β β X,  S Eβ X,  S β XT T A T E =− = = = − = −                (17) 
Table 6 and Figure 2 also reveal that the average return to college attendance is high in 2000 for young people in 
urban areas of the six provinces of China. 
Figure 3 plots the estimated weights used to form treatment parameters ATE , TT  and TUT .  ATE  
weights  MTE  evenly. TT  overweights the  ATE  for persons with low values of  s u  who, ceteris paribus, are 
more likely to attend college. TUT  overweights the  ATE  for persons with high values of  s u  who are less likely 
to attend college. Not surprisingly, in light of the shape of MTE  and the shape of the weights,  TUT ATE TT > > . 
This is also revealed in the Table 6. There is substantial heterogeneity among individuals and there is a positive 
sorting gain and a negative selection bias. 
In order to test the importance of introducing a proxy for ability in the wage equation, we exclude 
parental income from the wage equation and re-estimate the marginal treatment effects. The results are displayed 
in Figure 4. In this case, the MTE  increases in  s u  and its average value is obviously much higher than that in 
Figure 2. Therefore, neglecting ability (or its proxy) results in an upward bias for the marginal treatment effect 
and the estimated return to schooling. 
To explore the sensitivity of the estimates to various exclusions and inclusions, we present the estimates 
shown in Tables 7(a) – 7(d).  MTEs are plotted for various specifications of the model controlling (or not 
controlling) for sectoral choices and for ability (see Figures 5 and 6).   13
  Our main specification conditions on sectoral choices including the ownership structure of the firm. As is 
well known, conditioning on sectoral choices in the wage equation is likely to lead to an understatement of the 
full return to schooling because one benefit of education is that it facilitates choice of sector. When we drop 
various firm ownership and sectoral indicator variables, estimated returns go up (see Table 7d for estimates 
deleting all sectoral choice and ownership variables). This is clear from Figure 5. However, the effect of including 
or excluding these variables is very small on estimated marginal treatment effects.  Failing to condition on ability 
(parental income) raises the estimated return to implausible levels and changes the shape of the estimated MTE. 
This evidence is consistent with the findings of Carneiro (2002). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper uses newly available micro data to identify the returns to higher education in China. We 
demonstrate the importance of considering heterogeneity and selection bias. Neglecting these two factors leads to 
biased and inconsistent estimates such as those obtained using conventional OLS  and  IV  parameters.  We 
demonstrate the importance of proxying for ability in the wage equation to identify returns to education. 
Excluding it leads to implausibly high estimates of the return to schooling. On the other hand, controlling for 
sectoral choices barely budges the estimates. 
In 2000, the average return to four-year college attendance is 43% (on average 11% annually) for young 
people in the urban areas of the six provinces. The returns to those going to college are even higher. These 
estimates are all higher than the conventional OLS estimates of the Mincer model, which in turn are higher than 
the OLS estimates reported for earlier time periods. They imply that, after 20-plus years of economic reform with 
market orientation, the average return to education in China has increased substantially when compared to those 
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Table 1. Average Resident Income of Urban China in 2000 
(in RMB yuan) 
 







Average of the six provinces  7627 
China average  6280 
 
               Source: NBS (2001), China Statistical Yearbook on Price & Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2000,  
                             China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
All (n=587)  Treated (n=273)  Untreated 
(n=314)  Variable 
Mean  Std. 
Err  Mean  Std. 
Err  Mean  Std. 
Err 
Log  Wage  8.86 0.86 9.12  0.77 8.64  0.88 
Age  26.25  4.72 26.48  4.14 26.06  5.16 
Years of work experience  6.41  4.92  5.83  4.47  6.91  5.23 
4-Year college attendance  0.47  0.50  1  0  0  0 
Male  0.56 0.50 0.54  0.50 0.59  0.49 
Lived in Guangdong Province (GD)  0.18  0.39  0.19  0.39  0.18  0.38 
Lived in Liaoning Province (LN)  0.28  0.45  0.30  0.46  0.27  0.44 
Lived in Shaanxi Province (SX)  0.10  0.30  0.08  0.27  0.12  0.33 
Lived in Sichuan Province (SC)  0.16  0.37  0.15  0.36  0.17  0.38 
Lived in Beijing (BJ)  0.15  0.36  0.15  0.36  0.14  0.35 
Lived in Zhejiang Province (ZJ)  0.12  0.33  0.12  0.33  0.12  0.33 
Worked in state owned enterprises (SOEs)  0.62  0.49  0.72  0.45  0.54  0.50 
Worked in collective-owned firms  0.08  0.27  0.04  0.20  0.11  0.32 
Worked in joint-venture or foreign owned firms  0.18  0.39  0.19  0.40  0.17  0.38 
Worked in private owned firms  0.12  0.32  0.05  0.21  0.18  0.38 
Worked in IND_CON sector*  0.26  0.44  0.21  0.40  0.32  0.47 
Worked in TRA_COM sector*  0.03  0.17  0.03  0.17  0.03  0.18 
Worked in HOU_RES sector*  0.08  0.27  0.07  0.26  0.09  0.29 
Worked in SPO_SOC sector*  0.22  0.41  0.16  0.36  0.27  0.45 
Worked in CUL_SCI sector*  0.10  0.29  0.14  0.34  0.06  0.24 
Worked in FIN_INS sector*  0.11  0.32  0.09  0.28  0.13  0.34 
Worked in GOVERN sector*  0.03  0.16  0.04  0.20  0.02  0.13 
Worked in OTHER sector*  0.17  0.38  0.27  0.45  0.08  0.28 
Years of father’s education  11.36  3.38  12.26  3.26  10.57  3.28 
Years of mother’s education  9.90  2.99  10.41  3.31  9.46  2.60 
Parental income (in 1000 yuan)  21.39  16.59  24.36  15.89  18.81  16.78 
Born  before  1964  0.03 0.17 0.02  0.15 0.04  0.20 
Born  in  1964  0.02 0.14 0.01  0.10 0.03  0.17 
Born  in  1965  0.03 0.16 0.04  0.20 0.02  0.13 
Born  in  1966  0.02 0.14 0.03  0.16 0.02  0.13 
Born  in  1967  0.01 0.09 0.01  0.09 0.01  0.10 
Born  in  1968  0.03 0.16 0.03  0.17 0.02  0.15 
Born  in  1969  0.03 0.17 0.03  0.16 0.04  0.18 
Born  in  1970  0.05 0.22 0.03  0.16 0.07  0.26 
Born  in  1971  0.06 0.23 0.07  0.26 0.04  0.20 
Born  in  1972  0.05 0.22 0.05  0.22 0.05  0.21 
Born  in  1973  0.08 0.27 0.08  0.28 0.07  0.26 
Born  in  1974  0.09 0.28 0.10  0.30 0.07  0.26 
Born  in  1975  0.09 0.28 0.11  0.31 0.07  0.26 
Born  in  1976  0.11 0.31 0.14  0.35 0.08  0.27 
Born  in  1977  0.10 0.30 0.11  0.31 0.09  0.29 
Born  in  1978  0.10 0.30 0.11  0.31 0.09  0.29 
Born  in  1979  0.05 0.20 0.03  0.16 0.07  0.25 
Born  in  1980  0.04 0.20 0.01  0.10 0.07  0.25 
*: IND_CON stands for the sectors of industry, geological exploration & census, and construction; TRA_COM for sectors of traffic, transportation, post and 
telecommunication, commerce, catering trade, and material supply; HOU_RES for sectors of housing & public utility management, and resident service; 
SPO_SOC for sectors of sanitation, sports, and social welfare; CUL_SCI for sectors of culture, arts, & education, science, research, and technology services; 
FIN_INS for sectors of finance and insurance; GOVERN for sectors of state and institutions, party and government mass organization; OTHER for all the 








Coefficient Standard  Error Coefficient Standard  Error 
Intercept  8.3189 0.1493 8.3040 0.1552 
4-Year’s college attendance  0.2929 0.0630 0.5609 0.1695 
Years of work experience  0.0380  0.0194  0.0196  0.0202 
Experience  squared  -0.0016 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0010 
Parental income in 1000 yuan  0.0117  0.0020  0.0098  0.0023 
Male  0.1537 0.0602 0.1439 0.0607 
Lived in Guangdong Province  0.7543  0.1255  0.7908  0.1267 
Lived in Liaoning Province  0.2693 0.1085 0.3142 0.1092 
Lived in  Sichuan Province  0.2278 0.1181 0.2759 0.1192 
Lived  in  Beijing  0.7246 0.1241 0.7775 0.1256 
Lived in Zhejiang Province  0.6241  0.1297  0.6739  0.1314 
Worked in state owned enterprises  -0.3679 0.0855 -0.3873 0.0868 
Worked in collective-owned firms  -0.4786  0.1288  -0.5890  0.1298 
Worked in private owned firms  -0.4649  0.1179  -0.5304  0.1179 
Worked in IND_CON sector*  -0.2793  0.0788  -0.3048  0.0792 
Worked in TRA_COM sector*  -0.4512  0.1762  -0.4645  0.1779 
Worked in SPO_SOC sector*  -0.2880  0.0900  -0.3106  0.0905 
Worked in FIN_INS sector*  -0.3220  0.1050  -0.3327  0.1061 
 
*: IND_CON stands for the sectors of industry, geological exploration & census, and construction; TRA_COM for sectors of traffic, transportation, post and 
telecommunication, commerce, catering trade, and material supply; SPO_SOC for sectors of sanitation, sports, and social welfare; FIN_INS for sectors of 
finance and insurance. 
#: Using Propensity score as the instrument for four-year college attendance (Instruments are parental education and year of birth). 




Table 4. Estimated Logit Model For Schooling 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Mean 
Marginal Effect 
Intercept -4.7370  0.7305  - 
Years of father’s education  0.1017  0.0297  0.0211 
Years of mother’s education  0.0605  0.0342  0.0126 
Parental income in 1000 yuan  0.0190  0.0069  0.0040 
Born before 1964  2.0008  0.7969  0.4159 
Born in 1964  1.7285  0.9189  0.3593 
Born in 1965  3.3423  0.8257  0.6947 
Born in 1966  3.1813  0.8552  0.6613 
Born in 1967  1.8455  1.1126  0.3836 
Born in 1968  2.9030  0.8161  0.6034 
Born in 1969  2.2569  0.7941  0.4691 
Born in 1970  1.5076  0.7534  0.3134 
Born in 1971  3.0771  0.7138  0.6396 
Born in 1972  2.6424  0.7183  0.5492 
Born in 1973  2.5395  0.6809  0.5279 
Born in 1974  2.7740  0.6753  0.5766 
Born in 1975  2.7931  0.6763  0.5806 
Born in 1976  2.8634  0.6669  0.5952 
Born in 1977  2.5890  0.6672  0.5381 
Born in 1978  2.5572  0.6656  0.5315 
Born in 1979  1.3631  0.7636  0.2833 
 
 




Table 5. Estimated Coefficients from Local Linear Regression 
Guassian Kernel, bandwidth = 0.4 
 
High School  College 
Variable 
0 γ   Std. Err.  1 γ   Std. Err. 
Years of work experience  0.0360  0.0225  0.0141  0.0278 
Experience  squared  -0.0013  0.0011 -0.0009 0.0013 
Parental income in 1000 yuan  0.0188  0.0038  0.0077  0.0038 
Male  0.1365  0.0723 0.1913 0.0777 
Lived in Guangdong Province  0.5712  0.1961  0.8853  0.1590 
Lived in Liaoning Province  0.1901  0.1263 0.3929 0.1049 
Lived in Sichuan Province  0.2612  0.1364 0.2296 0.1081 
Lived in Beijing  0.7122  0.1695  0.7971  0.1301 
Lived in Zhejiang Province  0.6930  0.1551  0.5461  0.1744 
Worked in state owned enterprises  -0.3368  0.1188 -0.4471 0.1093 
Worked in collective-owned firms  -0.6060  0.2065  -0.5868  0.1771 
Worked in private owned firms  -0.4205  0.1511  -0.6256  0.1677 
Worked in IND_CON sector*  -0.2297  0.0821  -0.3978  0.0990 
Worked in TRA_COM sector*  -0.3527  0.1318  -0.5040  0.1557 
Worked in SPO_SOC sector*  -0.3702  0.1282  -0.3040  0.1202 
Worked in FIN_INS sector*  -0.3345  0.1560  -0.3543  0.1331 
 
*: IND_CON stands for the sectors of industry, geological exploration & census, and construction; TRA_COM for sectors of traffic, transportation, post and 
telecommunication, commerce, catering trade, and material supply; SPO_SOC for sectors of sanitation, sports, and social welfare; FIN_INS for sectors of 
finance and insurance. 
 













Selection Bias*** -0.2220 
Sorting Gain**** 0.0813 
 
* Using propensity score as instrument 
**  ATE OLS Bias − =  
***  TT OLS Bias Selection − =   
****  ATE TT Gain Sorting − =    




Table 7a. Estimates of Returns to schooling 




With parental income  Without parental income 
OLS 0.0732  0.0856 
IV* 0.1402  0.2192 
ATE 0.1084  0.2321 
TT 0.1287  0.1909 
TUT 0.0908  0.2679 





Table 7b. Estimates of Returns to schooling 




With parental income  Without parental income 
OLS 0.0873  0.1010 
IV* 0.1777  0.2549 
ATE 0.1439  0.2659 
TT 0.1588  0.2199 
TUT 0.1309  0.3059 
                                                *Using propensity score as the instrument 
 




Table 7c. Estimates of Returns to schooling 




With parental income  Without parental income 
OLS 0.0802  0.0920 
IV* 0.1241  0.2049 
ATE 0.0960  0.2204 
TT 0.1059  0.1639 
TUT 0.0874  0.2694 





Table 7d. Estimates of Returns to schooling 




With parental income  Without parental income 
OLS 0.0968  0.1109 
IV* 0.1703  0.2496 
ATE 0.1420  0.2630 
TT 0.1438  0.1992 
TUT 0.1404  0.3185 
*Using propensity score as the instrument 




Figure 1. Density of P(S=1)

















Figure 2. Marginal Treatment Effect
Including parental income as proxy for ability
in wage equation, all ownership and sectoral dummies



































Figure 4. Marginal Treatment Effect
 Excluding parental income in wage equation
But all ownership and sectoral dummies included














Figure 5. Marginal Treatment Effect
All specifications include parental income












                                                  A: with firms’ ownership dummies but not sectoral dummies 
                                                  B: with sectoral dummies but not ownership dummies 
                                                  C: with parental income as proxy for ability, 
                                                       no sectoral and ownership dummies 




Figure 6. Marginal Treatment Effect 
 All specifications exclude parental income









B NO A & B
 
                                                  A: only with firms’ ownership dummies 
                                                  B: only with sectoral dummies 
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